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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

MONTANA
Axtell v. M.S. Consulting, 955 P.2d 1362 (Mont. 1998) (holding that
genuine issues of material fact exist regarding abandonment of specific water rights and that summary judgment was improper).
M.S. Consulting owned a 110 acre parcel of land in Madison
County, Montana. The Axtells owned a two acre parcel within the
larger parcel. Eclipse Creek ran through both parcels. Several springs
were located on the large parcel, but outside the perimeter of the
small parcel. Over the years the Axtells and their predecessors in interest used one of the springs for their domestic water needs. M.S.
Consulting attempted to prevent the Axtells from using this spring.
The Axtells filed a complaint and obtained a temporary injunction
enjoining M.S. Consulting from interfering with the spring water supply. The Axtells then moved for summary judgment in the district
court. The court found no disputed issues of material fact and
granted summary judgment in favor of the Axtells.
The district court found that Ms. Florence Baker, the previous
owner of the entire parcel, had obtained water from the spring for use
on what is now the small parcel. The court also found that when Ms.
Baker divided the land she conveyed the large parcel away and reserved the small parcel. In so doing she necessarily reserved with the
small parcel the appurtenant water right, even though not expressly
reserved in the deed. The court determined that this water right
transferred with each new conveyance and ultimately to the Axtells. In
making these determinations, the district court held that summary
judgment was appropriate, entitling the Axtells to use all the waters of
the spring. M.S. Consulting appealed to the Montana Supreme Court
to review the summary judgment ruling. The supreme court reversed
and remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings.
In reviewing the lower court's grant of summary judgment, the supreme court first examined early Montana water law doctrine. Prior to
1973, water right adjudication followed the prior appropriations doctrine. Under that system a person could acquire an exclusive right to
use a specific amount of water by applying it to the land for a beneficial use. In 1973, the legislature enacted the Water Use Act which
abolished the prior appropriation system and implemented a new adjudication system. This system required new filings for existing claims,
and provided a statutory method of filing to establish all new claims.
The water right at issue in this case originated prior to the 1973 Water
Use Act, and therefore was determined under prior appropriation law.
Under the prior appropriation system, exclusive rights to use a
specific amount of water can be acquired by applying it to the land for
a beneficial use. Once a water right is acquired, the right is generally
appurtenant to the land where it is used, and passes with the conveyance of the land. A water right is severable from the land by conveying
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the land and expressly reserving the water right, or by conveying the
land and water right separately. The new owner may not enlarge a
transferred water right beyond the original owner's use.
Once a water right is acquired, the holder must continue to use
the water right for a beneficial purpose or risk losing it through abandonment. Abandonment arises when there is nonuse and intent to
abandon. Evidence of a long period of continuous nonuse raises a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon the water right.
In this instance, the spring water went unused on the small parcel
for a period of eleven years. M.S. Consulting argues that such nonuse
resulted in a loss of the water right. The Axtells argue that their
predecessors in interest did not abandon the water right because the
record shows that a water conveyance system existed during that time.
In reviewing the record, the court held that several issues of material fact existed with respect to the abandonment of the water right.
These disputes were material to the outcome of this case. If the water
right appurtenant to the small parcel was not abandoned, then the Axtells would have acquired the right. If abandoned, the water right was
not available to pass with the conveyance of the small parcel. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court for
further proceedings.
Tracy Rogers

NORTH CAROLINA
King v. State of North Carolina, 481 S.E.2d 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997)
(finding that a refusal to grant a 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341 Clean Water Act
certification, which resulted in Plaintiff being unable to subdivide
property as she desired, did not constitute a denial of all economically
viable use of the property and therefore, no taking had occurred).
Plaintiff desired to build a road and construct a 50 lot subdivision
on her property-a peninsula. The originally proposed project called
for placing between 10,000 and 20,000 cubic yards of fill material on
the property. According to Clean Water Act section 404, Plaintiff must
obtain a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers "COE" prior to
placing fill material onto wetlands. In addition, Plaintiff must provide
the COE with a certification that discharge of fill material is consistent
with state water quality standards. The Division of Environmental
Management ("DEM"), the department responsible for reviewing section 401 certification requests, refused to issue a certification, finding
that the proposed wetland fill would degrade surrounding shellfish waters, and that there were less environmentally damaging alternatives
for construction of the road.
Plaintiff appealed the decision, and later filed a claim asserting
that the decision to refuse section 401 certification and the section 404
permit had denied Plaintiff all reasonable use of her property and,

